Part IV. Japanese Capture of Nanjing

1. Japanese Occupation of Nanjing

As the city of Nanjing was surrounded on three sides and the situation was extremely urgent, Nanjing Garrison Commander Tang Shengzhi ordered his troops to prepare for street combat, while also strictly ordering no unauthorized troop withdrawals. The soldiers guarding Nanjing were in a very difficult and critical situation and were prepared for the idea of street combat inside the city. They only abandoned this intention after receiving the command from Chiang Kai-shek to retreat and the decision had been made for a full withdrawal from Nanjing, after weighing the entire situation.

Based on his strategic perspective to persist in a long-term war and maintain the necessary combat forces, on December 11, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek issued the retreat order to the Nanjing Garrison through Gu Zhutong, deputy commander of the Third Military Region. At noon on that day, Gu called Tang Shengzhi and said, “The Generalissimo has ordered the retreat of the Nanjing Garrison. You get to Pukou right away. I will have Hu Zongnan wait for you in Pukou.” Tang replied, “There are many things that should be explained clearly to the unit commanders before I can retreat. Otherwise, who will bear the responsibility later?” Gu emphasized, “The situation is very urgent.” Tang then stated, “I can only retreat tomorrow evening at the earliest. I cannot only consider one person's life and not those of the troops.”(1)

Not long after receiving the call from Gu Zhutong, Tang Shengzhi received from Chiang Kai-shek an order to retreat, which stated, “When you cannot hold out for long, you may retreat as circumstances allow, in order to regroup and counterattack.”(2) Several hours later, Tang received another retreat order from Chiang, with the same content as the previous order. The next day at 3:00 a.m., Tang met with Deputy Commanders in Chief Luo Zhuoying and Liu Xing, Chief of Staff Zhou Lan, and Tan Daoping, a director in the General Staff Office, to discuss the question of retreat. Zhou Lan led the General Staff personnel in drafting a retreat order overnight.

At 5:00 p.m. on December 12, 1937, Tang Shengzhi held a meeting at his residence with generals at the division commander level and above. Also in attendance were Luo Zhuoying and Liu Xing, Zhou Lan, and Deputy Chief of Staff She Nianci. Tang read aloud Chiang Kai-shek's two orders to retreat.

At the end of the meeting, Tang Shengzhi dictated instructions concerning certain provisions of the written retreat order: “If all units of 87D, 88D, 74A, and the Training Brigade cannot break through the siege, they can cross the river when there is a ferry, and gather in Chuzhou.”(3) This verbal command from Tang had a significant impact on the outcome of the Battle of Nanjing. More than five divisions were added to those to be transported across the Yangtze River. The original idea that “most units will break through the siege, and some will cross the river,” became in actuality “most units will cross the river, and some will break through.” This was something that the transport units were simply unable to accommodate. Many of the units that were to break through the Japanese lines instead flocked to the river. They totaled nearly nine divisions. The river bank was crowded with people but there were few boats, and the process was extremely confusing. The result was that many unorganized troops remained on the waterfront or inside the city. Some became Japanese prisoners, and others hid themselves among the civilian population.

Because the retreat order was issued hastily, some units did not receive notice of Tang's meeting. Due to the critical nature of the battlefield situation, even the commanders who had attended the meeting were unable to successfully direct their troops to make an orderly retreat or to break through the siege. Large numbers of troops assembled at the river in a disorderly manner, fighting for the ferries or wading in and swimming across, resulting in many tragedies.

Among all of the units defending the city, only the 2nd Army was safely evacuated in their entirety, because they obtained more than 20 private vessels to ferry them across the river. Except for the 5,097 casualties they had suffered in battle, the remaining 11,451 soldiers in that unit were all evacuated to the north bank of the Yangtze.(4) Two units from Guangdong, the 66th Corps led by Ye Zhao, and the 83rd Army under Deng Longguang, upheld the command to “break through the siege where you are” as they retreated. They gathered together and passed through Taiping Gate and Xianhemen on their way to Jiangning, Jurong, and other locations, finally regrouping in southern Anhui Province. They repeatedly encountered Japanese forces along the way, continuing to suffer casualties and losses. By the end, only 4,000 men were left. According to the data, about 100,000 of the large Nanjing Garrison force of 150,000 were lost, either in the bloody battle itself or in the disaster after the city fell. About 50,000 of them were able to safety retreat to the rear to refit.(5)

By December 13, 1937, the Japanese had occupied all of the gates in the ancient Nanjing city wall: Zhongshan and Taiping Gates to the east; Guanghua, Tongji, and Wuding Gates to the southeast; Zhonghua and Yuhua Gates to the south; and Shuixi and Hanzhong Gates to the west.

On the morning of December 13, the Japanese 16th Division's 20th Infantry Regiment occupied Zhongshan Gate without a fight and painted a line of white characters across the gate: “Occupied by the Ōno unit at 3:10 a.m. on December 13, Showa Year 12 [1937].”(6) Later that morning, the 35th Infantry Regiment of the Japanese 9th Division broke into the city through a gap in the wall to the left side of Zhongshan Gate that had been created by Japanese artillery fire.

Taiping Gate, to the north of Zhongshan Gate, was another important city gate. The troops defending that gate were a unit of the Training Brigade, and the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the Japanese 16th Division was the attacking unit. That regiment had captured the peak of Purple Mountain on December 12 after a fierce battle and, following 33rd Infantry Order No. 129, continued to advance toward the Observatory, on the slopes of the mountain, and then Taiping Gate. The regiment's “Detailed Battle Report” stated that, “On the 13th in the morning around 7:30, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions occupied the heights around the Observatory. On the same day at 9:10 some troops from the 2nd Battalion (the 6th Company, a machine gun squad, and an engineering squad) occupied Taiping Gate and had the Japanese flag fluttering high over the gate.”(7)

At Guanghua Gate, the Chinese troops defending the gate began to retreat during the night of December 12. The Japanese assaulted Guanghua Gate again in the early hours of December 13. According to the “Detailed Battle Report” of the Japanese 36th Infantry Regiment, at about 4:00 that morning near Guanghua Gate, “the sound of gunfire stopped completely, and there were no hand grenades thrown. The 1st and 2nd Battalions sent scouts to climb the wall a number of times to observe and, after they confirmed that most of the enemy had retreated, the 2nd Battalion commander ordered an immediate assault.” The report further recorded that, “At 5:00 a.m., the regiment commander came to the city wall holding the flag and made prostrations facing the Imperial Palace to the east. By that time, the eastern sky had already lightened.” At this point, Guanghua Gate had fallen completely.(8)

At Zhonghua Gate, the 2nd Company of the 13th Japanese Infantry Regiment's 1st Battalion assaulted and occupied the city wall on the west side of the gate at 3:00 a.m. on December 13. The battalion occupied about 200 meters of the wall to the west of the gate, while follow-up Japanese troops set up ladders and climbed the wall, braving a fierce hail of bullets. The Japanese occupied Zhonghua Gate at about 5:00 a.m. that day.

On December 12, at Shuixi Gate in the southwest corner of the Nanjing city wall, the Japanese, “relying on the assistance of the artillery forces, completely ripped open two big gaps in the southwest corner of the wall, but it was still very difficult to make an assault due to the river outside the wall and the resistance of the enemy nearby. After several rounds of concentrated artillery firepower support, at 4:45 p.m., the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment finally captured the wall, and that night gradually expanded its holdings on the wall.”(9) At about 8:30 a.m. on December 13, the 3rd Battalion of the Japanese 6th Division's 23rd Infantry Regiment was able to occupy Shuixi Gate.

Yuhua Gate, to the east of Zhonghua Gate, was another critical city gate. The railroad passed through Yuhua Gate, and it was an important transportation channel connecting Nanjing with the outside. After the Japanese army occupied the line along Yuhuatai on December 12, its 114th Division maintained the focus of its attack on the wall east of Zhonghua Gate and on Yuhua Gate itself. The division ordered its 115th Infantry Regiment to capture Yuhua Gate. At 12 noon, the 115th Infantry Regiment broke through the gate but, in the face of the Chinese army's fierce counterattack, the Japanese could not stand firm and failed to expand their holdings. In the early morning of December 13, however, the Japanese found that the Chinese troops were gradually retreating and, following orders, their troops then entered the city to conduct mop-up operations. At this point, the Japanese fully occupied Yuhua Gate.

On December 13, 1937, as the Japanese army captured each Nanjing city gate to the east, south, and west, they quickly sent troops to advance toward Xiaguan from both east and west of the city. Their strategic objective was to occupy Xiaguan, cut off the retreat of the Chinese army northward across the river, and surround and annihilate the Chinese forces outside the city walls.

Early that morning, to the east of Nanjing, an order came to the Sasaki Detachment to advance on and attack Xiaguan. That detachment was the backbone of the 38th Infantry Regiment of the Japanese 16th Division, which had attacked the northern foot of Purple Mountain. The order stated, “Today (the 13th), the Detachment will continue to focus on holding the left flank, and break through the central enemy forces in the direction of Xiaguan.”(10) Based on this command, the 38th Infantry Regiment, with light armored vehicles in the vanguard, advanced rapidly upon Xiaguan. The regiment arrived at the waterfront in Xiaguan at about 3:00 p.m., cutting off the Chinese army's retreat across the river. As the 38th Infantry Regiment moved toward Xiaguan on the morning of December 13, the 33rd Infantry Regiment also received the command from its direct superior, the 16th Division, to advance upon and attack Xiaguan. The 1st Battalion of that regiment occupied Hong Mountain at around 8:30 a.m. that day, then immediately advanced in the direction of Xiaguan by the nearest route and arrived there at 1:00 p.m.

Figure 1-4. On December 13, 1937, the Japanese Chiba Unit crosses the Qinhuai River to enter the city through Zhonghua Gate
Source: Shina sensen shashin: Shanhai sensen (Portraits of the China front: The Shanghai front) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1937—39)

To the west of Nanjing, in order to outflank and envelop Xiaguan, as early as December 10 the Japanese 6th Division issued a command to attack that location: “The forces on the left flank shall gradually shift their troops to the northwest and attack Shuixi Gate and Hanzhong Gate. The attached 6th Cavalry Regiment shall allow the bypassing troops to gradually enter the Xiaguan area to prevent the enemy from crossing the river.”(11) On December 11, the 45th Infantry Regiment, the main force on the left flank of the 6th Division, was originally to target Shuixi Gate, but outside that gate was a dense network of rivers, and they could not successfully launch an attack. They then changed direction to advance on Xiaguan.

Near the town of Shanghe on the morning of December 13, the Japanese forces advancing toward Xiaguan encountered and fought more than ten thousand Chinese troops turning back from Xiaguan and trying to break through from the front. The fighting was fierce; although the Chinese forces suffered many casualties, they also dealt the Japanese a heavy blow. Captain Ōzono, commander of the Japanese 11th Company, 3rd Battalion, 45th Infantry Regiment, was killed and dozens were wounded. On that same day, the Japanese 6th Division's 6th Cavalry Regiment also skirmished with Chinese forces. Around at 5:00 a.m., as the vanguard of that regiment circled from outside Shuixi Gate to advance toward Xiaguan, a skirmish took place near Mianhuadi with thousands of Chinese troops moving south from Xiaguan to break through the Japanese encirclement. The two sides met by surprise, because it was still dark and a thin mist filled the air. It was a very chaotic battle scene, even a melee, in which the Chinese troops suffered heavy casualties and were forced to retreat to Jiangxin Island, close to the south bank of the Yangtze River. According to Japanese military documents, there were about 6,000 Chinese casualties in that encounter.(12)

In the evening of December 13, the 6th Division's 45th Infantry Regiment and 6th Cavalry Regiment entered Xiaguan and rendezvoused with troops from the Japanese 16th Division, which had arrived first. On December 11, the Japanese Kunisaki Detachment, which had crossed to the north bank of the Yangtze River from Taiping in Anhui Province, had moved northward along that side of the river to advance on Pukou. After they had beat back the Chinese army's resistance, they had captured Pukou, just across the river from Xiaguan. This action completely cut off the Chinese army's northward route of escape by crossing the river.

Figure 1-5. Japanese warships arrive at the Xiaguan waterfront
Source: Shina Jihen shashin zenshū (chū) (Collected portraits of the China Incident (II)) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1937—39)

The 11th Squadron of the Japanese navy's Third Fleet had broken through several blockades in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, and other places. Led by the flagship Ataka, it arrived at the Xiaguan waterfront at 2:00 p.m. on December 13, 1937, and used the ship's guns and machine guns to fire mercilessly at the Chinese armed forces and civilians crossing the Yangtze River. At 5:00 p.m., warships from the Japanese 11th Squadron arrived at the docks at Xiaguan.(13)

On December 13, 1937, units under the Japanese Shanghai Expeditionary Army and Tenth Army attacked Xiaguan from the east and west outside Nanjing, and occupied Pukou, across the river from Xiaguan. Ships from the Japanese navy's Third Fleet, 11th Squadron, also arrived at Xiaguan by river and proceeded to blockade the Yangtze. The Japanese forces had therefore essentially achieved their operational objectives, namely cutting off the Chinese army's retreat and surrounding and annihilating the Chinese army outside of the city of Nanjing.

The Japanese forces then advanced on Nanjing, slaughtering along the way large numbers of innocent citizens and soldiers who had laid down their arms. The atrocities were even characterized by the barbarity of a “killing contest.”

On the way into Nanjing, two second lieutenants from the Japanese 16th Division's 9th Infantry Regiment, Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi, engaged in an inhumane competition to “behead 100 people.” Whoever killed 100 people first would be the winner. The contest began on November 27, 1937, when Wuxi fell to the Japanese. When they arrived in Changzhou on November 29, the two men together had used their swords to kill a total of 81 Chinese people. Three correspondents from Japan's Tokyo Daily News—Asami, Mitsumoto, and Yamada—interviewed the men in front of the Changzhou Railway Station. The November 30 Tokyo Daily News article, headlined, “Contest to behead 100! Two lieutenants surpass 80,” reported:

Two young officers from the Katagiri unit at the front launched a contest to “behead 100 people.” They reportedly began in Wuxi, and one of the men had soon beheaded 56 people, while the other had beheaded 25. One is Mukai Toshiaki, a second lieutenant from the Toyama unit (26 years old), from Kakumi Village in Kuga District, Yamaguchi Prefecture, and the other is Second Lieutenant Noda Tsuyoshi from the same unit (25 years old), of Tashiro Village in Kimotsuki District, Kagoshima Prefecture. At the waist of Lieutenant Mukai, ranked third dan in Kendō, hung a Magoroku of Shimonoseki sword, while Lieutenant Noda wore one that bore no inscription, but was a precious sword inherited from his ancestors.(14)

When Mukai and Noda invaded the Danyang county seat on December 2, along with their units, there was a sharp increase in the number of people they killed, especially for Noda, who was originally behind. The number soared to more than double; the two had killed a total of 151 people. The Tokyo Daily News published its second report on the “killing contest” on December 4, under the headline, “Rapid leap ahead in progress of contest to ‘behead 100’”:

On the road to attack Nanjing, the two second lieutenants, Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi, of the Toyama unit from the vanguard Katagiri unit under the XX unit, had begun a contest to “behead 100 people.” Since leaving Changzhou, after repeated fighting, and before entering Danyang at 6 p.m. on the 2nd, Lieutenant Mukai had beheaded 86 people, while Noda had beheaded 65 people. It is hard to tell what the outcome will be between the two men.(15)

On December 5, Mukai and Noda, who had already killed their way to the front at Jurong, had taken the lives of 89 and 78 people, respectively, further narrowing the gap between the two. The two special correspondents, Asami and Mitsumoto, quickly sent a third report to the newspaper about the killing contest. Under the headline “Big contest to ‘behead 100 people’ inspiring! Lieutenants Mukai and Noda! 89:78,” the Tokyo Daily News reported: “Two young officers in the Katagiri unit, Second Lieutenants Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi, have engaged in a contest to behead 100 people, with Nanjing as their objective. When capturing the city of Jurong, the two second lieutenants charged to the forefront and fought bravely. The two achieved evenly matched results prior the fall of the city: Mukai killed 89, while Noda killed 78.”(16)

At noon on December 10, Mukai and Noda met again at the foot of Purple Mountain in the eastern outskirts of Nanjing. At this point their score was 106 to 105, but because it was hard to tell which of them killed over 100 people first, they started the contest over again, with the goal of killing at least 150 people. On December 13, the Tokyo Daily News published a fourth report on the killing contest under the headline, “Incredible record in contest to behead 100 people: Mukai-106, Noda-105, both 2nd lieutenants go into extra innings,” along with their photograph taken in Changzhou by Satō Shinju. The report stated:

Katagiri unit warriors Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Gan [previously reported as Noda Tsuyoshi—Ed.], prior to invading Nanjing, began a rarely seen contest to “behead 100 people.” The two second lieutenants had scored a record of 105 to 106 by the time of the strategic battle at Purple Mountain on December 10. At noon on the 10th, the two lieutenants met again carrying their curved Japanese swords. Noda: “Hey, I beheaded 105; how about you?” Mukai: “I'm at 106!”...The two lieutenants laughed, “Ah, ha ha ha.” They ultimately failed to figure out who had killed 100 people by what time. “Then let's call it a tie. But how about we change it to 150 people?” They two soon reached an agreement. The “behead 150 people” contest began on the 11th.(17)

Although Mukai and Noda's killing contest took place against a background of fierce fighting as the Japanese army advanced on Nanjing, neither man was a front-line soldier tasked with charging enemy lines; one was an artillery squad commander and the other the deputy commander of a battalion. They used swords, which cannot be entirely relied upon to annihilate enemy soldiers in combat. It is evident that the majority of the people they massacred were unarmed civilians and soldiers who had laid down their arms. After returning home, Mukai and Noda were welcomed as “heroes” by their alma mater and invited to lecture students about the “courage” of the killing contest.

2. Atrocities Along the Route

The Japanese burned, killed, raped, and looted throughout their advance toward Nanjing, stopping at nothing, and causing heavy casualties and property losses in the outlying areas near the city.

It must be noted that the Japanese army's acts of savagery did not just happen to occur in the suburbs of Nanjing, but were synchronized with their acts of war. The Japanese perpetrated a series of atrocities beginning at the time that the Central China Area Army left the Songhu area of Shanghai to advance on Nanjing.

The Japanese 16th Division, as the first force to close in on Nanjing, passed from Danyang between the towns of Jurong and Tangshan in early December 1937. Sone Kazuo was a platoon commander in the 3rd Division's 34th Infantry Regiment, which marched along a route roughly the same as that of the 16th Division. According to Sone's account, five soldiers from that unit disappeared in a village near Jurong when collecting food:

So, the squad leader decided to wait until nightfall, after all of the villagers were asleep, and then set a fire to torch the village...we waited until late at night, when the villagers were determined to be asleep. We crossed the earthen wall and set fires everywhere; soon the fire quickly spread and flames raged everywhere, and the whole village burned down. The sleeping people awakened by the fire were in a panicked scramble to flee. At this time, we took advantage of the chaos to launch a raid. We killed every person we saw, and within only 10 or 15 minutes we saw not one more moving figure. Dead bodies were strewn everywhere.(18)

On December 6, 1937, the Japanese entered Hushan Village to the north of Tangshan and continued to kill, set fires, and seek out “young girls.” In one day alone on December 8, 11 villagers were killed by the Japanese. A villager, Dai Zhishan, recalled:

On the 6th of the 11th lunar month, in the eastern part of the village, the home of Dai Xingyun was on the east side, and the home of Dai Dalin was on the west. The 11 people were hiding in the gutters of the two houses' gables; they were caught by Japanese soldiers and killed in front of the Dai family's ancestral hall. These people included Dai Changji (in his forties), Dai Dalin (age about 50), Dai Dajun (about 50), Chen Kairong (not yet 30 years old, and his son Chen Fuda is still living), Wang Lirong (about 40), Dai Dajin (age about 50), Dai Xingyu (age 27 or 28), Dai Changshu (not yet 40 years old, with a daughter married and now living in Anhui), as well as a refugee hiding here from Zuochang. Wang Lirong was beheaded, and the others stabbed with bayonets.(19)

Mengtang and Hushan Villages, part of the town of Tangshan, were occupied by the Japanese army on the same day. The Japanese atrocities in Mengtang left painful memories for the village residents. Wang Xianzhen, a woman villager, said, “On the 4th of the 11th lunar month [i.e., December 6—Ed.]...two days after the bombs fell, the devils came in and blew up a lot of people on the bridge. My auntie and my father-in-law (age 44) were shot and killed by the devils as they ran away. I saw with my own eyes an old man named Zhang, age 50 or 60, and a five- or six-year-old boy from his family, kicked to death by the Japanese. At night on the way back from stealing grain, the devils killed a lot of people.... After they came into the villages, they wanted young girls. They caught two or three from our village (I don't remember their names), and I was very scared. The devils told the men to find girls for them; those who did not help were killed.”(20)

The Japanese occupied Tangshan on December 8 and committed atrocities in villages all around the town. Villager Zhang Lihai vividly remembered the Japanese gang-raping young girls and massacring villagers. He said, “At around 3:00 that day, on the 6th [i.e., December 8—Ed.], the sun had slanted to the west, and seven Japanese soldiers came down from their battery on the Tangshan mountain top. They gang-raped a 16-year-old girl in Woniushan, then inserted a pine branch into her genitals and tortured her to death. This girl was from Zhangxiao Village and everyone called her ‘Big Girl.’” Those seven Japanese soldiers then went to the entrance to a dugout at Yu Youren's house, forced the 15 villagers hiding in the dugout to come out to be searched, and arbitrarily executed them.(21)

The town of Shangfeng, located to the south of Tangshan, was occupied by the Japanese almost simultaneously with Tangshan. The village of Yaojiabian in Shangfeng also suffered the ravages of the Japanese. Villager Chen Engui described how the Japanese raped, killed, and burned in Yaojiabian:

It was the 5th of the 11th month of the lunar calendar (December 7, 1937), when two devils came to Yaojiabian. They were not carrying guns, only swords. They shut the door to Chen Qirui's family distillery and raped two women. One of them died on the bed then, and the other escaped from the distillery and committed suicide outside. When these two devils were finished raping, they summoned to the distillery three dozen people from outside the village hiding in the village, tied them up one by one, and stabbed them to death with their swords. Then they set a fire and burned down the house.(22)

After December 8, the Japanese advanced to the alternate positions at Purple Mountain, Yuhuatai, and the town of Jiangning. As the Japanese army advanced, its atrocities took place increasingly closer to the Nanjing city wall.

The appendix to the judgment in the war crimes case against Tani Hisao, by the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal, recorded the following: On December 9, four farmers—Jiang Dongwang, Jiang Haichou, Jiang Haiyang, and Jiang Haiqing—were killed in Xianghua Village. On December 10, worker Shao Yuanling was bayoneted to death on Yaowan Street; merchant Wang Guixi was shot dead at No. 64 Nengren Neighborhood because of the language barrier; a Mrs. Wang, née Sun, was machine gunned to death in Jing'er Village; and a Buddhist monk named Daochun was shot dead in Yanghuihong Village. On December 11, farmer Mrs. Yin, née Lu, was shot dead in Gaonianbai Village; peddler Dong Xinfu and his son Dong Zhijin were killed in Dengfushan because the Japanese unsuccessfully demanded goods; and a woman, Jia Hongying, was killed in Jiajiadong Village.(23) On December 11, the Japanese slaughtered 12 villagers all at once in Jiangdong Township, west of Nanjing. Villager Zhu Guanghong recalled:

In 1937, on the 9th of the 11th lunar month, I saw Japanese come over from the canal opposite us, riding four horses. We people in the village hid after seeing them. As soon as the Japanese came to the village and saw no one, they called out at the top of their lungs, and 13 people went then. They took them to the Longwang Temple. A man named Peng Erniu ran away, and the Japanese thought he was a Chinese soldier, so they killed all the remaining 12 people. My third and fourth uncles were among them.(24)

On December 12, the Japanese extended their atrocities to an area arcing along Xiaowei Street, Yuhuatai, Shuangzha, and Sanchahe. In the appendix to the judgment in the Tani Hisao war crimes case alone were recorded 120 cases of dispersed killings that occurred on that day in that area, in which 127 people lost their lives. They included the farmer Yin Shoujiang, killed in Dongwa Village on Xiaowei Street; Nanjing resident Cao Wendang and six others, killed at Yuhuatai; another six, including city resident Hu Changsheng, killed on Yuhua Road; Nanjing resident Li Falai and five others killed in Shazhouwei; citizens Zhang Dehong, Chen Lao'er, and Chen Erzi bayoneted to death at No. 25 Shuangzha Town; merchant Zhang Binglong shot dead at No. 36 South Shangxinhe Street; and two farm women, Mrs. Li, née Xu, and Ms. Ren, shot at No. 20 Beiwei Village in Sanchahe.(25) According to the narrative by a Buddhist monk named Longhai, “I was a monk at the Changsheng Monastery and personally witnessed the Japanese invaders come to the monastery after occupying the suburbs of Nanjing. They used rifles to shoot a group of 19 monks living at the monastery.”(26) That day at 6:00 p.m., the Japanese army also shot to death 11 people at No. 145 West Zhonghuamenwai Avenue, including Nanjing residents Wang Fuhe, Zhang Shuxin, Mrs. Zhang, née Ma, Zhang Yugen, Zhang Yufu, Zhang Xiaoliuzi, and Zhang Xiaogouzi. Only Zhang Yufa was injured and spared death.(27) On that day, the Japanese army smoked out and bayoneted villagers hiding in dugouts in Xiyang Lane, killing 22 people.(28)

3. Attacks on British and American Ships

As the Japanese army launched its comprehensive attack on Nanjing and the city was on the verge of falling, they wished to cut off the Chinese army's retreat and prevent its troops from escaping by boat. Japanese aircraft bombed and sank an American warship and shelled a British military vessel, creating serious diplomatic incidents.

On the morning of December 12, 1937, the Japanese continually bombarded an American gunboat, the USS Panay, which was anchored about 20 kilometers upstream of Nanjing. To avoid the dangers of the bombing, the Panay continued to move further upstream. Around 10:00 a.m., the ship was threatened and harassed by about 30 heavily armed Japanese soldiers. Later, the Panay stopped and dropped anchor 28 miles upstream of Nanjing. There were 59 officers and enlisted men aboard the ship at this time, as well as four US embassy officials, and nine news reporters and company personnel from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. The ship displayed multiple American stars-and-stripes flags. In the afternoon, squadrons of Japanese aircraft bombed and strafed the Panay, along with three commercial ships belonging to the Standard Oil Company. The action resulted in the sinking of the Panay, along with the commercial vessels Meiping and Meihsia.

During the bombing of the USS Panay, four people were killed, 11 seriously injured, and 32 slightly injured. The four killed included Italian reporter Sandro Sandri, along with the Meihsia's Captain Carlson, Petty Officer First Class Charles L. Ensminger, and Coxswain Edgar C. Hulsebus.(29)

As Japanese aircraft bombed the USS Panay and the nearby commercial vessels, the Japanese 18th Division's 13th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, under the command of Colonel Hashimoto Kingorō, shelled the British warship Ladybird near Wuhu on the morning of December 12, resulting in a number of casualties among its officers and sailors. Robert L. Craigie, the British ambassador to Japan, stated in a diplomatic note to Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota that, “The British Consul General, British Army Attaché, and Rear Admiral and Vice Chief of the British Yangtze River Patrol were taken as passengers on a tugboat from Nanjing to the river at Wuhu. The passengers then boarded the British warship Ladybird, and at this time the tugboat was subject to Japanese machine gun fire.... In addition, the British merchant ship Chinwo was also hit by an artillery shell. Then the British warship Bee arrived at the scene, and was also attacked by the artillery on the riverbank.” Colonel Hashimoto stated, “We received orders to fire at all ships on the river,” and “We shelled any vessel at all that simply moved on the river.”(30) The commander of the British Royal Navy's Yangtze River fleet reported the specific losses in the attack on the Ladybird. “A shell hit the port side at Position 31 on the waterline. A hole was punched in the No. 2 fuel tank connected to the No. 3 fuel tank. Water and oil mixed together and covered the area from between Positions 31 and 32. There was a steam pipe rupture in the windlass, the foredeck was hit on all sides, and the breech of the six-inch machine cannon was ruptured and damaged. The officers' quarters and lavatories were destroyed. A shell destroyed the stoker on the cabin deck, and Lonergan was killed on the port side between Positions 88 and 89.”(31)

During their invasion of Nanjing, the Japanese army ignored international norms in openly and boldly attacking the American and British ships. Although Japan adopted the necessary attitude and remedies afterward, the incidents cast a shadow on its future relations with the United Kingdom and the United States.

 


(1) Tang Shengzhi, “Weishu Nanjing zhi jingguo” [In the course of defending Nanjing], in CPPCC Battle of Nanjing Editorial Group, Battle of Nanjing, 4—5.

(2) Second Historical Archives, “Detailed Battle Report of the Nanjing Garrison Forces,” 413.

(3) Second Historical Archives, “Detailed Battle Report of the Nanjing Garrison Forces,” 414.

(4) “Xu Yuanquan zhi Jiang Jieshi midian (1937 nian 12 yue 23 ri)” [Secret telegram from Xu Yuanquan to Chiang Kai-shek (December 23, 1937)], RG 787, File No. 693, Second Historical Archives of China.

(5) Sun Zhaiwei, Nanjing Baoweizhan shi [History of the Battle of Nanjing] (Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Inc., 1997), 237—241.

(6) “Mijing shouji” [Notes of Itoi], in Zhang, Wang, and Ye, Historical Collection, Vol. 32, 408. The “Ono Unit” was named for Colonel Ono Yoshiaki, commander of the Japanese 16th Division's 20th Infantry Regiment.

(7) “Detailed Battle Report of 33rd Infantry Regiment Near Nanjing,” in Zhang, Wang, and Lei, Historical Collection, Vol. 11, 85.

(8) “Bubing Di-sanshiliu Liandui zhandou xiangbao” [Detailed battle report of the 36th Infantry Regiment], in Zhang, Wang, and Ye, Historical Collection, Vol. 32, 167.

(9) “Di-liu Shituan zhanshi xunbao di 13, 14 hao” [6th Division wartime ten-day reports no. 13 and 14], in Zhang, Wang, and Lei, Historical Collection, Vol. 11, 274—275.

(10) “Zuozuomu zhidui mingling” [Order to the Sasaki Detachment], in Zhang, Wang, and Lei, Historical Collection, Vol. 11, 46.

(11) “Liushi zuoming jia di 81 hao” [6th Division order no. 81], in Zhang, Wang, and Lei, Historical Collection, Vol. 11, 265.

(12) Ibid.

(13) “Liushi zuoming jia di 81 hao” [6th Division order no. 81], in Zhang, Wang, and Lei, Historical Collection, Vol. 11, 265.

(14) “‘Bairen zhan’ jingsai! Liang shaowei yi chaoguo 80 ren” [Contest to behead 100! Two lieutenants surpass 80] in Zhang, Wang, He, and Li, Historical Collection, Vol. 58, 95.

(15) “Jisu yuejin ‘bairen zhan’ jingsai de jingguo” [Rapid leap ahead in progress of contest to “behead 100”] in Zhang, Wang, He, and Li, Historical Collection, Vol. 58, 112.

(16) “‘Bairen zhan’ da bisai yongzhuang! Xiangjing, Yetian liang shaowei! 89:78” [Big contest to ‘behead 100 people’ inspiring! Lieutenants Mukai and Noda! 89:78], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 34 ce: Riben junguo jiaoyu—bairen zhan yu zhu Ning lingguan shiliao [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 34: Japanese militarist education: materials on killing contests and occupation of consulates in Nanjing], ed. Zhang Xianwen and Zhang Sheng, trans. Lei Guoshan, et al. (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 21.

(17) “‘Bairen zhan’ chao jilu: Xiangjing-106, Yetian-105, liang shaowei jinxing yanchang zhan” [Incredible record in contest to behead 100 people: Mukai-106, Noda-105, both 2nd lieutenants go into extra innings] in Zhang, Wang, He, and Li, Historical Collection, Vol. 58, 212—213.

(18) Sone Kazuo, “Rijun shibing Zenggen Yifu ‘Siji Nanjing Da Tusha’ (jielu)” [Japanese soldier Sone Kazuo's “Private recollections of the Nanjing Massacre” (excerpts)], in Riben diguozhuyi qinhua dang'an ziliao xuan bian: Nanjing Da Tusha [Selected archival materials from the Japanese imperialist occupation: The Nanjing Massacre], compiled by Central Archives, Second Historical Archives of China, and Jilin Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1995), 995.

(19) “Dai Zhishan koushu” [Oral history of Dai Zhishan], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 26 ce: Xingcunzhe diaocha koushu (zhong) [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 26: Oral history survey of survivors (2)], ed. Zhang Xianwen, Zhang Lianhong, and Dai Yuanzhi (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 867.

(20) “Wang Xianzhen koushu” [Oral history of Wang Xianzhen], in Zhang, Zhang, and Dai, Historical Collection, Vol. 26, 888.

(21) “Zhang Lihai koushu” [Oral history of Zhang Lihai], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 27 ce: Xingcunzhe diaocha koushu (xia) [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 27: Oral history survey of survivors (3)], ed. Zhang Xianwen, Fei Zhongxing, and Zhang Lianhong (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 1182—1184.

(22) “Chen Engui koushu” [Oral history of Chen Engui], in Zhang, Fei, and Zhang, Historical Collection, Vol. 27, 1218.

(23) “Gu Shoufu zhanfan an panjue shu fujian: Guanyu fensan tusha bufen tongji jielu (1947 nian)” [Appendix to the judgment in the Tani Hisao war crimes case: Excerpts of data on dispersed killings (1947)], in Second Historical Archives of China and Nanjing Municipal Archives, Archives of the Nanjing Massacre, 322.

(24) “Zhu Guanghong koushu” [Oral history of Zhu Guanghong], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 25 ce: Xingcunzhe diaocha koushu (shang) [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 25: Oral history survey of survivors (1)], ed. Zhang Xianwen, Zhang Lianhong, and Zhang Sheng (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 144.

(25) Second Historical Archives and Nanjing Municipal Archives, “Appendix to the Judgment in the Tani Hisao War Crimes Case: Excerpts of Data on Dispersed Killings,” 291—348.

(26) “Rijun zai Changsheng Si jiti shahai shimin de diaocha biao jielu (1946 nian 7 yue 20 ri)” [Excerpts from survey regarding collective killing of citizens by the Japanese army in Changsheng Monastery (July 20, 1946)], in Second Historical Archives and Nanjing Municipal Archives, Archives of the Nanjing Massacre, 159.

(27) Second Historical Archives and Nanjing Municipal Archives, “Appendix to the Judgment in the Tani Hisao War Crimes Case: Excerpts of Data on Dispersed Killings (1947),” 165.

(28) “Oral History of Sun Yucai,” in Zhang, Zhang, and Zhang, Historical Collection, Vol. 25, 57.

(29) US Department of State, “The Commander in Chief of the US Asiatic Fleet (Yarnell) to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson) (December 23, 1937),” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 19311941 (Vol. 1), 542—546.

(30) “Kelaiqi dashi zhi Guangtian waixiang de zhaohui (1937 nian 12 yue 30 ri)” [Diplomatic note from Ambassador Craigie to Foreign Minister Hirota (December 30, 1937)], as translated in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 67 ce: Dongjing panjue Rifang wenxian ji baodao [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 67: Japanese documents and reports from the Tokyo Tribunal], ed. Zhang Xianwen and Cao Dachen, trans. Lei Guoshan, et al. (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2010), 33—34.

(31) “Rijun dui Yingguo Huangjia Junchuan Piaochong hao de gongji (1937 nian 12 yue 14 ri)” [Japanese attack on British Royal Navy warship Ladybird (December 14, 1937)], as translated in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji, di 31 ce: Yingguo shilingguan wenshu [Nanjing Massacre historical collection, Vol. 31: British consulate documents], ed. Zhang Xianwen, Zhang Lianhong, and Chen Qianping, trans. Qiu Beiling and Qin Wenhua (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 22. Lonergan was a sailor working as a sick berth attendant aboard the Ladybird.